[This book review was originally published here on ‘The Cardus Daily’ Blog on June 8, 2011.]
In his latest book, Beyond the Gods & Back: Religion’s Demise and Rise and Why it Matters, Reginald Bibby sets out to answer these questions: “What is the situation with religion today?” and “What does it mean for Canadian life and lives?”
Building upon his earlier work, Bibby notes the steady decline in religious identification, attendance, and belief between the 1960s and mid-1990s, followed by leveling off—and in some cases, an upswing in religiosity—that suggested signs of new religious life and led some to conclude that we were seeing a renaissance of religion. It prompted a re-evaluation and even abandonment of the secularization thesis postulated by prominent social scientists. Upon closer examination of the data and trends since the mid-1990s, Bibby suggests we are seeing neither the death nor the rebirth of religion in Canada, but rather an increasing polarization between the religious and non-religious, between theists and atheists.
Bibby notes that although religion no longer occupies centre stage in Canadian life and culture, rumours of its demise are exaggerated. God is not dead, and we have not killed him. Religion has proven remarkably resilient in the face of significant cultural, philosophical, and demographic shifts, and a sizeable number of Canadians continue to identify as religious, believe in a deity, and attend worship services on a regular basis. At the same time, increasing numbers of Canadians identify as having no religion, never attend worship services, and indicate they do not believe in the existence of a deity—in other words, they are “living beyond the gods.” This, says Bibby, is an example of growing religious polarization.
Insofar as the implications for Canadian society are concerned, Bibby notes that people can be happy both with and without religion; that those who do not identify as religious nonetheless indicate that they have spiritual needs; and that the means by which spiritual needs are met will continue to diversify. As Canada becomes more ethnically diverse, the complexion of Canadian religion will change. Bibby notes that changing immigration patterns have led to a growth of the Sikh, Muslim, and Hindu communities, and that such communities demonstrate a higher degree of “religiosity” than some of the more established mainline Christian communities. Weary mainline Christian denominations may ultimately disappear as newer, more vibrant expressions of Christianity as well as non-Christian religious communities thrive.
In contrast to Bibby, who sees a numerical leveling off of religious believers amidst increasing polarization, Eric Kaufmann asserts that religious fundamentalists are on course to take over the world through demography as secularist liberalism becomes increasingly frail. In his book, Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?, Kaufmann notes that as openly non-religious people worldwide have fewer and fewer children, fundamentalists are successfully bucking the trend.
Kaufmann reinforces Bibby’s thesis that we are seeing signs of increasing polarization as moderate faith is being squeezed by both secularism and what Kaufmann calls fundamentalism. Kaufmann observes that secularism mainly erodes unconscious religion, what he refers to as the “taken-for-granted, moderate faiths that trade on being mainstream and established.” Self-conscious religion that places real demands on its adherents, offers an implicit or explicit critique of the excesses of secularism, and provides its adherents with a sense of identity and belonging in an otherwise indifferent or even hostile environment is the type of religion that survives.
According to Kaufmann, the convergence of religious fundamentalism and demographic revolution could have significant consequences for the future of secular liberalism. Fundamentalist incursions on such liberal strongholds as freedom of expression, freedom of choice, individual fulfillment, and minority rights may for some signal the end of Western civilization as we know it. Jihadism, armed conflict over land settlements and violent attacks, may continue; however, Kaufmann predicts that the restraining forces inherent in religion may limit this possibility. The greatest threat, he suggests, is the threat to liberal ideals—the risk that fundamentalism will replace reason and freedom with moral puritanism.
While academic musings about the threat of fundamentalist incursions into sacred secular space and populist warnings about the risk of fundamentalist violence have a certain resonance, Kaufmann’s concerns may be misplaced. Among his key examples of demographically vibrant “fundamentalist” groups are North American Hutterites, the Old Order Amish, Finland’s Laestadian Lutherans, and Haredi Jews—groups that are both endogenous (originating from within) and endogamous (marrying within). By and large isolationist and neither evangelistic nor politically active, the likelihood of such groups achieving world domination through demography seems slim.
And yet Kaufmann remains concerned. Uneven fertility rates among the religious and non-religious will provide the former a demographic advantage over the latter in the coming decades, with the result that fundamentalists may transform from small, insular communities to sizeable minorities and perhaps even majorities within the span of a century.
So what should the secularist faithful do? Kaufmann does not have any ready answers. Pronatalist policies may encourage secularists to have more children and stem the demographic tide. Secularists could impose restrictions on religious freedom or religious political expression, but these would run directly contrary to the principles of liberalism and democracy. Secularists may launch evangelistic crusades of their own and seek to win over the children of the religious faithful to the cause of secularism.
Given that both theism and atheism, religiosity and secularism, are here to stay, the answer may lie in the ability of secularists and the religious to respect not only one another’s differences but also one another’s ability to be different, granting each the space to live out their respective creeds and ways of life without seeking to impose their beliefs and norms on the other—a philosophical and political modus vivendi. Liberalism’s dilemma will be whether and how to accommodate illiberal religion, thus allowing their fundamentalist fellow citizens the freedom to live according to seemingly illiberal values and to make illiberal choices. Religion’s greatest challenge will be to ensure its faithful live out the best, and not the worst, that religion has to offer, loving their enemies enough to let them openly defy God without declaring holy war. The challenge for both will be to exercise humility, recognizing both the weaknesses of their own and the strengths of the other’s perspectives and ways of life.
Thankfully, in Canada, we have managed this tension to date. The culture wars of the United States are relatively muted in Canada, and we have not witnessed the kinds of open conflict observed in the banlieue riots in France. Planned attacks on and bombings of innocent civilians in other parts of the world have not been replicated here. That said, emotionally charged debates over such issues as abortion and same-sex marriage, growing concern about the emergence of an American-style religious right in Canada, the challenges of accommodating devout religious groups in laїque Quebec, and public attention to the work of evangelistic atheists such as Christopher Hitchens, Richard Dawkins, and Sam Harris show that we cannot ignore the tensions that exist.
Kaufmann argues that fundamentalism develops in explicit opposition to secularism, by opposition minorities who feel spurned by ethnic or ideological majorities. These minorities can respond with exaggerated and intransigent forms of religious identity. If this is true, we would do well to remain attentive to the public discourse as well as mainstream attitudes toward religious and ethnic minorities. Dismissing the religious faithful as silly and superstitious, or, worse, portraying them as presenting an intolerable threat to liberal ideals will only sow the seeds of discontent. Likewise, demonizing non-believers or blaming our country’s woes on its citizens’ unbelief does little to advance the common good. Finding a via media in public discourse, as well as in public policy, may be the most effective safeguard against the kinds of conflict that may grow out of an inflexible commitment to fundamentally irreconcilable ideals.
In Canada, we continue to navigate this tension. While our mainstream political discourse is largely devoid of overt religious expression, the importance of religion is never far from politicians’ minds. Recognizing the importance of the so-called “ethnic vote” to their electoral success, politicians in English-speaking Canada have reached out to new immigrant communities with a host of political promises and policies that respond to their social and economic needs. At the same time, Stephen Harper’s commitment to establish an Office of Religious Freedom in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the three national party leaders’ attendance at important Sikh events, and Stephen Harper’s and Jack Layton’s participation in Easter celebrations are a tacit recognition of the importance of religion to many of Canada’s existing and new immigrant communities.
Meanwhile, Gilles Duceppe fights for the hearts and minds (and votes) of Quebeckers by appealing to secular nationalist ideals, and his warning that a Conservative majority government could lead to a reintroduction of limitations on abortion is a reminder of the values that ardent secularists believe are at stake if the wrong party gets into power or the wrong voters are permitted to influence public policy. Stephen Harper’s rapid dismissal of this as a possibility and conservative evangelical Charles McVety’s counter-warning that socially conservative voters may simply stay home on election night are evidence that these tensions remain.
Whether—and to what extent—Canada will continue to navigate this tension successfully remains to be seen. Perhaps the last word belongs to Bibby, who predicts:
In the immediate future, religious polarization appears to be something that can be subsumed under our pluralism umbrella. In fact . . . there is reason to believe that the religious polarization we are experiencing may be a “pluralism plus.” The very fact that Canada is characterized by neither a religious monopoly nor a secular monopoly may be contributing to an enhanced capacity to handle religious and non-religious diversity in a way that is fairly unique in the world. (96-7)